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DISQUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT: 
LIBERAL AGENDAS, DOMESTIC LEGAL 
ORDERS, AND THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER THE 
COLD WAR AND AMID RESURGENT 
CULTURAL IDENTITIES 
Jacques deLisle* 
On the eve of the twenty-first century, a fin-de-siecle unease 
pervades assessments of the future roles of international law. 
The recent past seems a poor guide to what promises, or threat­
ens, to be an era posing unfamiliar transnational problems and 
calling for innovative legal solutions.1 Two developments have 
struck at the foundations of contemporary international law. 
These are the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent 
global retreat of communist ideology, and the resurgence of 
ethnicity, religion, and culture as principal bases of identity and 
foci of conflict with international significance.2 They have ren­
dered suspect the underlying premises of much received -vvisdom 
on both sides of the debate about whether international law 
plays, or would come to play, a major or a marginal role in world 
affairs.3 
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; J.D., 1990, Harvard 
Law School; Ph.D. candidate, political science, Government Department, Harvard; 
A.B., 1982, Princeton University. 
l. On the end of the nineteenth century as an era in which an old, coherent order 
had unraveled, and in which new circumstances demanded a new approach or under­
standing that had not yet formed, see generally CARL E. ScHORSKE, FIN-DE-SIECLE VI­
ENNA: POLITICS AND CULTURE 3-4 ( 1981); GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO CoNTEMPORARY HisTORY 31-32 (1967). 
2. As indicated below, these phenomena jointly produce circumstances that frame 
the challenges now confronting international law. The nvo developments are also inter­
related in a simpler way. Ethnic tensions and nationalist passions contributed greatly to 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its empire. This collapse, in turn, helped to 
unleash ethnic, cultural, and religious politics within and beyond the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. See, e.g., ZmGNIEW BRZE ZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE 87-90, 
247-50 (1990). 
3. See, e.g., INIS L. ClAUDE, JR., SwoRDs INTO PLOWSHARES 69-80 (1956) (describing 
some of more expansive notions of international law's prospective role, under United 
Nations, as constraint on states); EDWARD H. CARR, THE TwENlY YEARS' CRISIS: 1919-
1939 170-80 (2d ed. 1946) (seeing relatively significant role for international law as law 
among community of states); HEDLEY BuLL, THE A'\IARCHICAL SoCIETY 140-42 (1977) 
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The result is a crisis in international law, and in thought 
about the nature and importance of international law. It is a 
crisis in the Chinese sense - a conjunction of danger and op­
portunity.4 This concept of crisis is apt, for today's dangers and 
opportunities come in large part from events in the East (not 
least from the Chinese world) and from the choices the West 
faces in responding to them. While the crisis is ubiquitous, it is 
these East Asian developments, and possible reactions to them, 
that provide the principal examples here. 
The present challenges are qualitatively different from 
seemingly similar past assaults on established notions of interna­
tional law as part of a "liberal" or "Western" international order. 
The new challenges are arguably more severe and certainly more 
complex. The possibility of a coherent and relevant response 
appears to lie not in a simple defense of familiar ideals but in a 
new, and selective, emphasis on human rights and liberal values 
as a fighting faith and as a basis for a transnational consensus 
among subnational groups.5 If this claim is correct, the project 
and the prospect for international law in the coming years are, 
perhaps more than is generally recognized, matters of transna­
tional, even domestic, law and politics. 
The international legal and political order that is now in 
deepening crisis can still be characterized and caricatured as a 
liberal order. It posits autonomous, formally equal, sovereign 
states as its basic units. States, individually or collectively, are no 
(discussing international law's real, if modest, contributions to intemationai order); 
HANs]. MoRGANTHAU, PoLITICS AMoNG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR Powu. AND PEACE 
279-82, 297-300 (5th rev. ed. 1978) (describing real but quite circumscribed role for law 
in international order structured by self-interested pursuits of nation-states seeking 
power and security); KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL PoLITICS 170-76 
(1979) (describing international order as defined by distribution of power among 
states, with little or no role for Jaw, and bipolar structure as conducive to stability); 
RoBERT 0. KEoHM-lE, AFTER HEGEMONY: CooPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WoRLD 
PoLITICAL EcoNOI'viY 245--47 (1984) (assessing, favorably, prospects for cooperative de­
velopment by '"like-minded countries" of rule-like practices and institutions to govern 
interactions among states with actually or potentially complementary interests). 
4. The Chinese word "weiji" is usually translated into English as "crisis." Weiji is 
composed of characters meaning "danger" (wei) and "opportunity" (ji). See THE PINYIN 
CHINESE-ENGLiSH DICTIONARY 307, 713 (1983) (providing English translations for all 
u'1ree Chinese terms). 
5. This argument, set forth briefly in this Essay, is explored more fully with respect 
to U.S. laws and Chinese human rights issues in a forthcoming article, Beyond Cultural 
Relativism and 'Evangelical Liberalism': Defining a Role for A men·can and International Law in 
Addressing Hmnan Rights in China. 
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more authorized or justified in examining or forcing changes in 
the internal practices and preferences of other states (or in de­
stroying other states) than a person would be in his or her deal­
ings with fellow citizens in a liberal society domestically. Such an 
order creates normative and structural imperatives not to recog­
nize and confront diversity in legal and political behavior, and 
attitudes within and among states.6 
Certainly, this order has not been immune from pressures 
for change. The ideological polarization of the Cold War, the 
critique of national quests for "modernization" as "Westerniza­
tion," and the efforts during the last couple of decades to move 
human rights farther up on international political and legal 
agendas were all in some tension with a Westphalian, nation­
state based order.7 Nonetheless, the structure long survived 
those corrosive forces, as we saw underscored in the renaissance 
surrounding the Gulf War, of collective security pursued within a 
framework of venerable international legal rules and conven­
tional international institutions.8 Whether such an approach 
6. See generally Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 4, 8,  
9, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25,  27; Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess. , Supp. No. 28, at 
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (recognizing dury of nonintervention in states' domestic 
choices of political, economic, social, and cultural systems, and inviolability of states' 
territorial integrity and political independence); Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies 
and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL & Pus. AFF. 205 (1983); Stephen D. Krasner, Regimes and the 
Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 355, 355-
56, 366-67 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (discussing consequences of conception of 
international system as being composed of egoistic sovereign states differentiated only 
by power capabilities). 
7. On the Peace of Westphalia as a defining moment in the emergence of a nation­
state-based international order that overcame earlier competing claims founded in pur­
portedly universal norms, see HARoLD K jACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 13 
(2d ed. 1984). Communist, liberal democratic, and human rights ideologies obviously 
entail claims of universal validity that disregard national boundaries. The Westerniza­
tion-modernization debate is in more subtle tension with a pure nation-state order. 
While the charge of "Westernization" suggests a cultural relativism that appears to en­
dorse national autonomy and distinctiveness by rejecting the West as a universal model, 
the charge also labels social, political, and legal phenomena that in practice have fre­
quently accompanied economic development or decolonization as someu'ling other 
than inevitable aspects of modernization. Thus, what might be defended as generically 
modem or inevitable is denounced as acquiescence in another contingent ideology 
claiming universal applicability. See general!y C. E. BLACK, THE DYNAMICS OF MoDERNIZA­
TION 5-13 (1966) (discussing meaning of modernity). 
8. See S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 295lst mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674 (1990); S.C. 
Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (l990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N. 
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can, or should, remain the paradigm, as the consequences of the 
decline of Soviet power and communist ideology and the erup­
tion of subnational and transnational allegiances further unfold, 
are much closer questions. 
Strong claims, both explicit and implicit, that culture, reli­
gion, or ethnicity define the proper boundaries of a sovereign 
state, and the appropriate content of its legal rules, are rampant. 
On the battlefields of the former Yugoslavia, in the latter-day 
Confucian pronouncements of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, and 
in the proliferating struggles over the place of Islam in society 
and government throughout much of Asia, there emerges a 
broad challenge to the relevance of an international legal order 
that does not take as a central concern cultural differences 
among and within nations, and the substantive and substantial 
diversity in approaches to domestic and international law and 
politics that such differences entail. 
The challenge is more profound than a cultural relativist or 
anti-colonialist critique, updated for the 1990's and brought into 
sharper focus by the removal of the distorting lens of Cold War 
politics. In its heyday, the cultural relativist view that Western 
legal values, including human rights and other assertedly univer­
sal principles of international law, were inappropriate for much 
of the world was held primarily by left-leaning Western intellec­
tuals. Such commentators were distrusted as potentially conde­
scending or anti-developmental in much of the recently 
decolonized world, and nearly disregarded in the practice of in­
ternational law and politics.9 
SCOR, 2978th mtg. , U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 ( 1991); H.RJ. Res. 77, 102d Cong. , 1st Sess. 
( 1991) (enacted as P.L.102-1); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Strike on Iraqi 
Intelligence Headquarters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1183 (June 28, 1993) (citing 
international law basis, and compliance with U.N. procedures, for action); Remarks to 
United States Army Troops Near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, 26 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 
1900 (Nov. 22, 1990) (stating U.N. and international law bases for U.S. military pres­
ence); cf DANIEL P. MoYNIHAN, ON THE LAw OF NATIONS 120-23 (1990) (describing 
deciine in U.S. government's commitment to international law during 1980's). 
9. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HuM. 
RTs. Q. 400 (1984) (providing general and critical discussion of cultural relativism); 
Adamantia Follis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Appli­
cation, in HuMAN RIGHTS: CuLTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Follis & Schwab 
eds. , 1980) (setting forth strong version of cultural relativist perspective); BILL WARREN, 
IMPERIALISM: PIONEER OF CAPITALISM 252-55 (1980) (arguing that leaders of former col­
onies belatedly recognized growth-destroying effects of embracing theories that blamed 
underdevelopment on Western-dictated order and rejected progressive colonial legacy 
' 
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Where kindred notions had greater practical impact, they 
generally proved compatible with an international legal order of 
nation-states as juridically equal "black boxes." Thus, anti-colo­
nial and separatist assaults on existing arrangements typically in­
voked the norms of the existing system 10 - seeking recognition 
of a new sovereign state within colonial boundaries or coinci­
dent with areas inhabited by a particular people. With borders 
redrawn in the name of self-determination around a more cul­
turally or ethnically homogenous group, the new nation could 
be absorbed into the fold as just another state with internal af­
fairs of presumptively little international legal import.11 
Where the international community could not or would not 
ignore deviance in domestic legal regimes, excuses and justifica­
tions often were available. When illiberal regimes and the con­
sciences of liberal regimes could not find sufficient cover in the 
principle of sovereignty over domestic affairs or in the necessity 
of accommodating unpalatable allies in the Cold War, the expla­
nation was likely to be that suspect states merely had, for exam­
ple, struck a somewhat different balance between civil-political 
and socioeconomic rights (all of which were highly valued and 
universally shared) . Alternatively, deviant state conduct might 
be dismissed as being part of a necessary transitional period of 
progress toward realization of fundamental rights and the rule 
of emerging indigenous capitalism). U.S. statutes conditioning aid and trading privi­
leges on the domestic behavior of foreign governments contain little or nothing that 
suggests any accommodation of cultural relativist arguments. Typical statutory stan­
dards are compliance with the requirements of "internationally recognized human 
rights" (a phrase likely to draw the scorn of cultural relativists), market-oriented eco­
nomic principles, demoLratic government, or free emigration. See 22 U.S.C.S. 
§ 2304(d)(l) (1994); 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2295(a) (1994); 12 
U.S.C.S. § 635(b) (2) (1994); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(a) (1) (1994) (providing, in security 
assistance statute, that United States shall "in keeping with the constitutional heritage 
and traditions of the United States" promote observance of human rights in other 
countries "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"). 
10. See, e.g., RoBERT W. TucKER, THE lNEQUALITI OF NATIONS 58-60, 67-69 (1977). 
11. Although the new nation-states created through decolonization in Asia and 
Africa often had much less ethnically and culturally homogenous populations within 
more arbitrarily drawn boundaries than did most of the states that emerged from ear­
lier waves of nationalism in Europe (or are now emerging in the former Soviet and 
Soviet-dominated areas), the ex-colonial states were more culturally (and geographi­
cally) integrated than the vast and European-based empires to which they formerly be­
longed. See, e.g.,  CRAWFORD YouNG, THE PoLITICS OF CuLTURAL PLURALISM 1 1-12, 23-26, 
66-71 (1976) (examining interaction of culture, identity, and politics). 
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of law.12 
The culturalist challenge to international law as we enter 
the t<.,venty-first century is qualitatively different, and more at 
odds with the principles of the existing order, in two ways. First, 
such assaults on the integrity of many nation-states and on the 
character of their internal political and legal orders are not sim­
ply balkanizing. Rather, they are often supranational, cutting 
across international boundaries and binding together dissident 
or nationalist groups in several states. Pandemonium looms, but 
the fragments also threaten to coalesce into broader clashes of 
civilizations.13 Thus, Islam not only defines the fault lines be­
tween secular central governments and their religious revivalist 
local opponents in China, Malaysia, and nations much nearer 
the heart of the Muslim world, and as far west as Bosnia. It also 
joins some of these groups together in a shared project that 
numbers among its aims a return to the substantive legal and 
governmental principles of Islam.14 
12. For an example of both sorts of claims in post-Mao official Chinese pronounce­
ments, see R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: The(fly and Practice in Chinese Law 
Today, in HUMA.N RIGHTS IN CoNTEMPORARY CHINA 41, 67 (Randle Edwards et a!. eds., 
1986). For an indication that the post-War U.S. political and legal tradition accords 
some substantial recognition to economic and social rights, see KENPO UAPAN CoNST. ] 
arts. X-XL ( including, in constitution imposed by U.S.-led post-World War II occupa­
tion government, social and economic rights, as well as rights similar to those found in 
U.S. Bill of Rights, among "human rights" guaranteed to Japanese citizens). For an 
indication that contemporary U.S. legislation recognizes some form of the claim that 
shortcomings during a "transition period" must be recognized and accepted, see 2 2  
U.S.C.S. § 2295a (permitting aid to states formerly pan o f  Soviet Union i f  such states 
are «acting to . . .  make significant progress tmvard, " inter alia, democratic government, 
rule of law, and economic reform based on "market principles"); Exec. Order No. 
12,850, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,327 ( 1993) (conditioning continuation of China's most-favored­
nation trade benefits on "significant progress" on, not immediate full compliance with, 
several specific human rights matters). For the principal statements of international 
legal standards for human rights, see generally Uni•1ersal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. 1/810 (1948); Interna­
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 2 1st Sess. , 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) ; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. , Supp. No. 16, at 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 ( 1966). 
13. See DA.."!IEL P. MoYNIHAN, PANDEMONIUM: ETHN!CITY IN INTERNATIONAL PoLITICS 
24-25, 168-70 (1993) (arguing that ethnic strife, principaily as centrifugal force within 
nations, is now greatest threat to internatjonal peace and security); Samuel P. Hunting­
ton, The Clash of Civilizations?, FoREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 29-35 (arguing that 
"fauit lines" between civilizational groupings, generally much larger than nation-states, 
"will be the battle lines of the future"). 
14. See, e.g., lv1alaysian Siaie Approves i\Iuslim Laws to Cut Olf'Limbs, Japan Economic 
Nev15 Wire, Nov. 25, 1993, availahle in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US file ( reporting 
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Second, culturalist challenges to international legal norms, 
particularly in the area of human rights, have grown more ag­
gressive and self-confident. Thus, there is little tone of excuse, 
request for temporary indulgence, or even much interest in dia­
logue to be found in Lee Kuan Yew's exegeses on the superiority 
of an Eastern way in law and politics that stresses order and com­
munity over rights and extreme individualism. The same can be 
said of China's post-Tiananmen assertion of its own great human 
rights achievements and criticism of vVestern nations' shortcom­
ings, and its longer-standing dismissal of human rights as a bour­
geois concept and mere pretext for Western interference in 
China's internal affairs, and of several governments' united insis­
tence upon a valid, distinctively Asian interpretation of human 
rights in the face of the 1993 Vienna international conference 
on universal human rights.15 
enactment, in Malaysian province ruled by Islamic opposition party, of punishments 
including stoning and whipping as part of effort to govern through Koran-based laws; 
laws apply only to Muslims and would require federal government approval); Philip 
Shenon, Sungai Penchalajoumal: A Malay Plot? Or Just a Well-Meaning Commune?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, at A4 (reporting that ground for Islamic Al-Arqam sect leader' s  
arrest was plot to replace secular government with Islamic fundamentalist regime); Bar­
bara Sopkin, Mosl�m Fundamentalism Warries East Asian Governments, Agence France 
Presse, Aug. 8, 1994, available in LEXJS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Is­
lamic AJ-Arqam and Malaysia's main Islamic opposition party share goal of making Ma­
laysia an Islamic state and that China is cracking down on intervention in secular affairs 
by religious groups in heavily Muslim Ningxia area); Catherin Sampson, Bombers Raise 
Chinese FeaTs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File 
(reporting that Chinese authorities see bombing incident attributed to separatist Mus­
lims in XirBiang area in west of country as example of growing cross-border links be­
tween Muslims in China and violent fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan and Paki­
stan). 
15. See Philip Shenon, To fusty) Flogging, Singapare Cites 'Chaos' on U.S. Streets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr . 13, 1994, at A2 ( quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister 
of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, as saying that U.S. society is rich, but not safe and peaceful 
and not type of society Singapore chooses, and dismissing U.S. talk about human rights 
as convenient sloganeering); Fareed Zakaria, Order and Libe.,-ty, East and West, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 1994, at Al9 (quoting former Prime Minister and current Senior Minister of 
Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew as saying that the "expansion of Lhe right of an individual to 
behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the 
East, the main objective is to have a well-ordered society . ... The fundamental differ­
ence ber.veen Western concepts of society and government and East Asian concepts is 
that Easter:n societies believe that the individual exists in the context of his family. "); see 
also GuovroYUAN XIN'At:N ZHu, ZHONGGUO DE RENQUAN ZHUANGKUA.NG [STATE CouNCIL 
NEws OFFICE, THE STATE OF Hu�tAN RrcHTS IN CHINA ] (1991) (known widely as the 
"vVhite Paper"). The \Nhite Paper and tt'le Chinese government's subsequent public 
pronouncements on human rights issues show an increased willingness to accept that 
international standards are rekvant and appiicable in China. Nicholas D. Kristof, China 
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Furthermore, the regimes urging alternative concepts of 
purportedly universal legal norms increasingly meet the formal 
and procedural requisites of democracy, 16 thereby weakening 
many potential criticisms that invoke liberal international law 
principles. At least absent the unlikely and disquieting advent of 
superstates organized along cultural or civilizational lines, 17 irrel­
evance or perversity of consequences seems to await any ap­
proach to international law that fails to recognize such richly 
substantive and strikingly transnational developments as some­
thing much more than peripheral issues in a game among co­
herent, unitary actors, essentially undifferentiated except in 
their levels of power. 
The crumbling of Soviet power and the retreat of commu­
nist ideology inside and beyond the former Soviet empire are 
Issues Rebuttal to Human Rights Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, § l, pt. l, at 12; Philip 
Shenon, Want to Sell China's Record on Human Rights? Get Mr. Smooth, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 
28, 1994, § 4, at 7 (reporting that president of nominally non-governmental Chinese 
Society for Human Rights criticized Western nations' failures on human rights); cf 
Wang Xiujing, Shehuizhuyi renquan yu zebenzhuyi renquan de genben qubie [Basic Distinctions 
Between Socialist Human Rights and Capitalist Human Rights] and Li Linmei, Zhuquan 
yuanze he renquan de guoji baohu [The Principle of Sovereignty and International Protection of 
Human Rights] in ZHONNGUO SHEHUI KExuE YuAN FAXUE YANJIUsuo, DANGDAJ RENQUAN 
[CHINESE ACADEMY oF SociAL SciENCES, LEGAL REsEARcH INsTITUTE, CoNTEMPORARY 
HuMAN RIGHTS] 205-20, 362-74 ( 1992) (post-White Paper publications reflecting the 
longer-standing Peoples Republic of China approaches stressing that human rights 
have different characteristics in different class society contexts, and the status of na­
tional sovereignty over domestic matters as a legal principle in no way inferior to 
human rights claims); see also Susumu Awanohara et a!., Vienna Showdown, FAR E. EcoN. 
REv., June 17, 1993, at 16 (describing Asian critique of Western attempt to impose 
"Western traditions" in guise of human rights); Michael Vatikiotis, Cultural Divide, FAR 
E. EcoN. REv. ,  June 17, 1993, at 20 (describing emerging East Asian theory of "situa­
tional uniqueness" to justifY "distinctive positions on human-rights issues"); Gordon 
Fairclough, Standing Firm, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Apr. 15, 1993, at 22 (reporting Asian 
nations' agreement in preparation for Vienna Conference on Bangkok Declaration, 
which stresses non-interference in internal affairs and "socio-economic, historical and 
cultural backgrounds" as legitimate sources of human rights variations). 
16. See SNv!UEL P. HuNTINGTON, THE THIRD \NAvE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
T-WENTIETH CENTURY 5-9, 21-26, 28-30 (1991) (discussing trend towards democracy 
since mid-1970's). 
17. On the continuing strength and importance of states in an era of "civiliza­
tional" cleavages and loyalties, see Fouad 1\jami, The Summoning, FoREIGN AFF., Sept.­
Oct. 1993, at 2, 9 ("[C]ivilizations do not control states, states control civilizations."). 
The difficulties and dangers of any attempted transition to civilization-states lie, not 
least, in what would be required to overcome the persisting strength of nation-states, in 
the near-impossibility (absent massive dislocation of people) of drawing boundaries in 
mixed areas, and in the potential multiplication of ethnic and nationalist pressures for 
disintegration that already plague more modestly sized nation-states. 
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central elements in another challenge to the existing order in 
international law and politics. Shaken, indeed shattered, are a 
bipolar structure and a polarizing ideology that together made 
the nation-state the central institutional focus and marginalized 
concern with differences in legal and political regimes among 
and within nations, except for those differences immediately rel­
evant to the Manichean struggle between communism and lib­
eral democracy. 
It has become less plausible to conceive of international law 
and politics in either of two familiar ways: (1) as a global order, 
anchored by two superpowers, in which two types of states, 
although very different internally, can interact under shared and 
neutral, albeit sparse, rules, even as they take sides in other 
countries' civil conflicts (conceived of as conflicts over which 
"side" such ultimately unitary states will join); or (2) as a partial 
order among the nations of the West and some of their ex-colo­
nies in which the United States, as hegemon, provides and en­
forces more elaborate, more law-like rules of international inter­
action within a more limited community.18 Exposed and per­
haps encouraged by the decline of such analytical frameworks 
and the patterns of behavior they explained and endorsed is a 
world in which states are more seriously fragmented internally, 
with many groups embracing radically divergent ideas about do­
mestic and international law, and sharing common goals with 
like-minded groups in other countries. 
Such challenges to the received order might appear to be 
mere extensions of developments recognized for the last twenty 
years or more. Certainly, "interdependence theory" in interna­
tional relations scholarship, academic legal arguments for focus­
ing on "transnational law" (and not the narrower, more state­
centric field of "international law"), and the practices such argu­
ments reflected and influenced all sought to deal with a world in 
which legal and political rules could not assume that nation­
states were internally cohesive and externally impermeable.19 
18. Such views of international relations run through political scientists' writings 
on international relations, although their theories make surprisingly little reference to 
international law. See MoRGANTHAU, supra note 3, at 282, 363-64 (discussing first view); 
WALTZ, supra note 3, at 193 (discussing first view); see also KEoHANE, supra note 3, at 3 1-
39 (discussing second view). 
19. RoBERT 0. KEoHANE & JosEPH S. NYE, PoWER ru'-ID INTERDEPENDENCE: WoRLD 
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 3-8, 23-28, 33-36 ( 1977); HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, 
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Nonetheless, the concerns that animated those responses 
seemed to require, at most, only moderate reform of the estab­
lished order. 
Before the widespread retreat from Marxist-Leninist ortho­
doxy and before the Soviet implosion, the most visible forces un­
dermining a state-centered international legal order were mar­
ket-oriented economic exchanges, organizational networks 
among cosmopolitanly-educated elites in business, government, 
or citizens' groups, and ties that linked groups in industrial de­
mocracies and narrow segments of the rapidly developing 
world. 20 Generally, the political focus of such transnationally 
linked groups was on relatively narrow issues and on influencing 
national laws and policies through established, legitimate chan­
nels. There was little in this that immediately and fundamentally 
challenged the political integrity of the relevant sovereign states 
or that seemed any more seriously in tension with a liberal inter­
national order than domestic liberalism always had been.21 
Although it is hard to demonstrate with certainty, we now 
seem to face a more volatile combination of deeper and more 
varied intranational schisms between groups and potentially 
stronger international links among them. Cold War organiza­
tional and ideological structures are no longer available to sup­
press, channel, or at least mask, primordial or nascent cleavages 
TRAl"'SNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (3d ed. 1986); PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 
2-3 (1956). 
20. Interdependence with the industrial democracies and the rest of the Western­
linked world was limited for pre-reform communist states by such states' monistic and 
totalistic domestic political structures and ideologies that limited the growth of the kind 
of autonomous groups that established transnational netv/orks elsewhere, and by their 
autarchic approach to international economic relations rooted in a "siege mentality" 
reinforced by Western hostility (sometimes reflected in statutes governing international 
economic relations). See ToNY SMITH, THrNJ-t..ING L:KE A CoMMUNIST: STATE AND LEGITI­
/-.1ACY IN THE SoviET UNION, CHINA, Ai"'D CuBA 182-85, 191-92 (1987) (discussing essen­
tial characteristics of communist thought); see also A. DoAK BARNETT, CHINA IN THE 
WoRLD EcoNOM"'i 122-32 (1981) (describing struggle between Cultural Revolution radi­
cals a:1d proponents of reform about political significance of opening China to foreign 
investment and trade). For U.S. stawtes denying trade and aid to communist countries, 
see, e.g., 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994) (tying countries' most-favored-nation ("1-vfFN") status 
to emigration freedoms they grant to citizens); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2370 (1994) (prohibiting 
assistance to present Cuban government). 
21. For illustrations of the tensions bctvveen some liberal principles (chiefly equal­
ity) when applied to si2tes and when applied to individuals ·.vithout regard w interna­
tional boundaries, see Tucker, supra note 10, at 61-62; CHARLES R BEITZ, PoLITICAL 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL Rf.L\.T!ONS 65-66, 18.'2 (1979). 
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in seemingly countless states, old and new. In Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, in reform-era China, and in the 
rapidly developing nations of East Asia, the network of transna­
tional economic ties has expanded rapidly to encompass, and to 
penetrate more deeply, areas that are more thoroughly non­
Western in their legal and political cultures and less fully m arket­
oriented in their laws, policies, and practices. Moreover, with 
new legal tolerance and new technology, a diverse transnational 
flow of ideas has rapidly come to supplement, and sometimes 
threaten, ties based on business or on narrow issues. 
Thus, Chinese leaders determined to rein in perceived ex­
cesses of reform face not merely the risk that hard-won, modest 
advances toward rule by law may wither, but also the prospect of 
stinging trade sanctions under U.S.  law and costly U . S.-backed 
delays in j oining world trade bodies. 22 Domestically, they face an 
unprecedentedly vVesternized and outward-looking group of dis­
sidents and critics who are sophisticated about, and insist upon, 
domestic law reform and adherence to international legal 
norms.23 
Similarly, a Malaysian political leadership that downgrades 
Malay-Muslim nationalism and economic planning to reaffirm a 
secular legal order, the benefits of English education in acces­
sing Western knowledge, and the virtues of pro-market laws and 
22. See Exec. Order No. 1 2,850, su,vra note 12 ;  Lionel Barber & Nancy Dunne, 
Fears Grow that Bush Will Back Dovm on China, FrN. TIMES, Nov. 2 1 ,  1991 ,  § I, at 9 (describ­
ing mixture of human rights and trade issues in negotiations between president and 
Congress over conditions to be imposed on renewal of China's MFN status) ; cf. Thomas 
L. Friedman, China Syndrome, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 8, 1 995, § 4, at 19 (reporting that U.S. 
business executives who support Uni ted S tates ' imposing trade sanctions against China 
for intellectual property violations and blocking China's entry into World Trade Organ­
ization, see link between Chinese government's human rights abuses and trade abuses, 
with both reflecting absence of rule of law) .  
23. See, e.g. , Wei jingsheng, The Fifth Modernization, i n  THE FrrrH MoDERNIZATION: 
CHINA's HurvtAN RlcHTS MovEi\IENT, 1978-1979 (James D. Seymour ed., 1980) (present­
ing argument, by one of leading participants in Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79, 
that post-Mao regime should and must recognize human rights ) ;  TvVilliam P. Alford, 
Douhle-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People 's Republic of China, in 
CHINA IN TRANSFORMATION 45, 45-46, 57-59 (Tu Wei-ming ed. , 1 994) (detail ing attempts 
to seek judicial redress against Party and state organs and officials, principally for ac­
tions taken against p lain tiffs in connection with plaimiffs' roles in 1 989 protests) ;  Pat­
rick E. Tyler, In Beijing, Dissideats Fi/;; New Petitions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1 995, at A8 
(reporting that, in order to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, Chinese 
dissidents petitioned National People's Congress to strengthen rule of law, and to un­
dertake investigations of cases where citizens ' legitimate rights have been violated by 
authori ties) . 
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policies confronts newly radical challenges from m ovem ents that 
seek to enact Islamic law as state legislation or that threaten to 
become a diffuse state within the nation, beyond the reach of 
sovereign power. The regime, correctly or not, sees conspiracies 
that cross national boundaries and a rising international tide of 
Islamic fundamentalism behind its troubles, and feels compelled 
to prove its own Islamic bona fides even as it cracks down on reli­
gious radicals.24 In such a world, a perspective that sees a prime 
virtue in legal rules that are simple, uniform, and international 
(in the sense of being rules for and among nation-states) does 
not portend a central and leading role for law in international 
affairs. 
The great danger for those who favor a strong role for na­
tional law in the coming years is a failure to adapt to the chal­
lenges of internal fragmentation and transnational ties. Several 
signs of the perils of a failure of imagination are visible .  First, an 
attempt to reanimate some of the hoariest principles of the past 
seems doomed to frustration. Relying on principles of collective 
security and the sanctity of sovereign states, and organized in 
large part through the United Nations, the Gulf War alliance in­
creasingly seems confined to its facts and the stuff of nostalgia ­
incapable of repetition, yet subj ect to pervasive review.25 Beset 
with doubts about the appropriate grounds and practical conse-
24. William Case, Malaysia in 1 993: Accelerating Trends and Mild Resistance, 34  AsiAN 
SuRv. 1 19, 1 20-24 ( 1 994) (describing government's policies); Malaysian State Approves 
Muslim Laws to Cut Off Limbs, supra note 1 4; see generally Wu MIN AuN, THE MALAYSIAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM 38-40 ( 1 990) (describing jurisdiction of Islamic courts in Malaysia); Ah­
med Rashid, March of tlre Militants, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Mar. 9,  1 995, at 19 (reporting 
Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir's banning of fundamentalist Islamic Al­
Arqam sect, in part for training death squad in Thailand); Shenon, supra note 14 ,  at A4 
(noting that Islamic Al-Arqam sect claims numerous sympathizers abroad); Michael 
Richardson, Malaysia and Neighbors to Curb Sects, INT ' L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 5, 1 994, avail­
able in, LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File (reporting that Islamic Al-Arqam sect oper­
ates some 50 villages in Malaysia with schools, shops, health clinics, and other facilities 
for members; that sect is banned, or faces banning, in Indonesia and Brunei; that its 
leader is  banned from three neighboring countries; and that 19 Malaysian members of 
sect were arrested at Cairo fundamentalist demonstration in April, 1 994) ; Sopkin, supra 
note 1 4  (reporting that Al-Arqam sect leader lived in exile in Jordan after 1988) . 
25. For analyses of the Gulf War's implications for international law and U.S. for­
eign relations iaw, and a recognition that replicabil ity of the Gulf War approach is se­
verely limited, see Paul W. Kahn, Lessons for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. 
L. REv. 425 ( 1 993) ; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 452 ( 1 99 1 ) ;  Burns H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in Intemational and Foreign Rela­
tions Law, Continued, 85 A!.t. ]. ll'n'L  L. 5 1 6  ( 1 99 1 ) ;  Michael ]. Glennon, The Gulf War 
and the Constitution, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1991 ,  at 84. 
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quences of intervention, the tortured and hesitant multilateral 
efforts to address the Bosnian crisis may better indicate the fate 
awaiting such conventional approaches under the conditions 
likely to prevail in the coming years. 
Second, the international legal enterprise shows signs of 
shrinking toward public regulation of international trade and in­
vestment. That possibility is illustrated by the Clinton Adminis­
tration's East Asian diplomacy that has emphasized international 
legal standards for fair trade, U.S. laws that impose trade sanc­
tions or deny most-favored-nation status, and cabinet-level road 
shows to promote U.S. business abroad.26 Here, the interna­
tional legal norms of free trade amid limited economic national­
ism are relatively steady beacons, and the recognition of subna­
tional actors with transnational links (and domestic legislative 
and regulatory agendas) can be relatively frank and open.27 
Such an approach, however, threatens to exclude from the cen­
tral focus of international law much that is of interest and impor­
tance in world affairs . 
Third, imprecise notions of broad principles of interna­
tional law or isolated fragments of international law doctrines 
both may be invoked haphazardly and unsystematically to sup­
port particular actions. The United States' humanitarian inter­
vention in Somalia, its delayed intervention by invitation in Ha­
iti, and its decoupling of human rights and trade in China, sug­
gest the ambiguities and limitations of such approaches to the 
uses and meaning of international law. Without some integrat-
26. See, e.g. , Susumu Awanohara & Nayan Chanda, Uncommon Bonds, FAR E .  EcoN. 
REv., Nov. 1 8, 1 993, at 1 6-17  (reporting that U .S .  goals at Asia-Pacific Economic Coop­
eration ("APEC") forum are to accelerate global trade l iberalization, and to strengthen 
trade with Asia) ; David E. Sanger, President Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Goods, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 5, 1995, § I,  at 1 ( announcing sanctions to be imposed under "super 301 "  provision 
of trade statutes, 19 U.S.C.S. § 2420) ; Exec. Order No. 1 2 ,850, supra note 1 2 ;  Patrick E .  
Tyler, Ron Brown i n  China: Trade Gets a n  open Door, Human Rights the Closet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 1 994, § 4, at 2 ( reporting on mission to China by U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown and U.S.  executives to promote sign ing of agreements between U.S .  firms and 
Chinese) . 
27. See, e.g. , Friedman, supra note 22, at 19 ( reporting pressure and support from 
U.S. business interests in decisions to de-link MFN and human rights, and to impose 
sanctions for Chinese violations of intellectual property rights) ; Sanger, supra note 26, 
at 1 ( reporting U.S .  Administration 's explanation of how sanctions were crafted so as to 
minimize harm to U.S .  industries and consumers) ;  Awanohara & Chanda, supra note 
26,  at 1 6- 17  (quoting U.S. State Department official on importance of domestic job 
growth in U.S.  approach to APEC summit) . 
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ing strategy or guiding norms, it proves exceedingly difficult to 
articulate determinative criteria, especially ones sounding in in­
ternational law, for deciding what action to take, what counts as 
successful action, and why to act m one case and not in an­
other.28 
Nevertheless, the cns1s confronting international law 
presents opportunities as well as dangers. For those in the West 
who seek a vibrant role for international law, there is something 
potentially liberating in the new cultural challenge' s  shaking the 
early post-colonial belief in an elaborate and largely inseverable, 
if internally contradictory, package of a liberal legal order 
among nation-states and liberal legal orders within states. The 
same can be said of the impact of the Soviet collapse and the 
more widespread softening of communism on the sense of mor­
tal duty to promote and protect that package unquestioningly. 
vVith former senses of confidence and urgency gone, propo­
nents of a liberal order and a leading role for law in global af­
fairs may, indeed must, turn to a more critical examination of 
their goals and a more strategic approach to the roles of interna­
tional law. 
The critical examination entails an inquiry into what on the 
laundry list of specific human rights, democratic values, sover­
eignty, self-determination, and the like make the most compel­
ling demands now that it seems impossible, and unnecessary, to 
pursue simultaneous progress on all fronts. Given the decline in 
28. For the variety of international legal principles available, and the flexibility of 
their connections to a course of action, delayed action or inaction ,  see Letter to the 
President, 1 3  OP. Orr. LEGAL CouNs. 6, 7 ( 1 992) (suggesting that "pri n ciples of custom­
ary international law" justify planned American military intervention in light of "urgent 
need for h umanitarian assistance" and "breakdown of governmental authority, " but de­
clining to decide the issue in light of other sources of authority, including Security 
Council resolution authorizing all necessary means for promoting human i tarian relief, 
statutory authorization for h umanitarian aid, and President's general authority over use 
of troops) ; Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY COMP . PREs. Doc. 180 1 
(Sept. 18 , 1 994) (citing, in support of troop deployment after in ternational accord 
reached, U.N. resolution authorizing "all necessary means" to restore democratic gov­
ernment, particular national security interests of United States in responding to gross 
abuses of human rights and in promoting restoration of democratic government) ; The 
President's News Conference, 30 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1 1 66 ( May 26,  1 994) (be­
cause "best opportunity to lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human 
rights" in China is through continuation of most-favored nation s tatus and promotion 
of increased contacts, President will extend China's MF1--J trade status despite China's 
fail ure to satisfy standard, mandated as condi tion of renewal in previous year's China 
MFN executive order, of "overall significant progress" in specific areas) . 
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the persuasive power of Cold War, cultural relativist, and anti­
colonial justifications for an order based upon unitary nation­
states, the most appealing and promising move may be to shift 
emphasis toward the previously subordinate project: interna­
tional law's contribution to the promotion of liberal values 
within nations. Thus, minimal dignitary interests - freedom 
from torture, arbitrary imprisonment, or severe material depriva­
tion - may merit pride of place, possibly on the ground that 
little else of value can be secured in their absence. 29 Alterna­
tively, political process values, such as democratization, might 
warrant preeminence, perhaps on a theory that such principles 
best combine the promise of participation, which may be valued 
for its own sake, and of a mechanism well-suited to the achieve­
ment of preferred substantive outcomes.30 
If a persuasive lexical ordering of specific values proves elu­
sive or incomplete, a strategic approach becomes all the more 
essential. A strategic approach requires asking whether it will be 
successful or efficient to undertake expenditures of concededly 
limited material and moral resources to advance the realization 
of particular principles. Promotion of minimal dignitary inter­
ests, for example, may score high in expected efficacy, for these 
interests may well be matters of broad transnational consensus 
29. That intuition would also appear to be reflected in the tendency of intema·· 
tiona! human rights organizations to focus much of their en ergy on questions of arbi­
trary or politically motivated detention, severe custodial punishments and the l ike. See, 
e.g. , HuM>\N RiGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995 ( 1994) ; AsiA WATCH, ANTHEMS OF DE. 
FEAT: CRACKDOWN IN HuNAN PROvlNCE, 1 989-92 ( 1 992 ) ;  AMNESTY INTERNATiONAL, ToR­
TURE IN THE EIGHTIES 4-5 ( 1984) ; A\1NES1Y lNTERNATIONA.L, POLITICAL lM!'RISONMENT IN 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ( 1978 ) .  
30. Compared to the vision evident in some earlier American forays i n to promo­
tion of democracy abroad, it  is likely that such a notion of democratization wil l  have to 
be relatively sparse in its requirements, and thus relatively broad in its definition of 
what is to be expected or accepted. See SAMUEL P. HuNTINGTON & JoAN M. NELSON, No 
EASY CHOiCE 42 ( 1 976) ( noting that developing countries face trade-offs among increas­
ing political participation, increasing economic growth, and fostering social and eco­
nomic equality) . Compare HuNTINGTON, supm note 1 6, at 164-209, 253-58 ( describing 
considerable variety of methods by which, and contexts in which, recent transitions to 
democracy have occurred, and have differed from earlier "waves" of democratization) 
and GuiLLERMO O 'DoNNELL & PHILIPPE C. ScHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AuTHORITA­
RL;_N RULE: TENTATNE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES ( 1986) ( noting 
same) with RoBERT PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WoRLD 1 23-30 ( 1 973) 
(discussing U.S. conviction in the 1950's and 1 960's that U.S. aid could result in eco­
nomic growth, broad!)' rising standards of living, stability, and democratic politics ali 
emerging smoothly, mutually reinforcingly, and along essentially U.S. or Western lines 
in developing countries ) .  
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(and of even broader lip-service). Alternatively, democratic val­
ues may seem strong candidates because their lack of obvious 
and immediate substantive content promises flexibility sufficient 
to accommodate diverse political and legal cultures. 
Such ruminations over pragmatism and principle are ini­
tially likely to occur primarily in major industrial democracies' 
domestic debates about foreign affairs laws and policies. Some 
elements of the approach they might yield are already in place, 
although those elements are at best fragmentary and subject to 
much revision. The U.S. Code, for example, includes numerous 
provisions imposing sanctions or denying aid on the basis of 
other states' noncompliance with a variety of specific interna­
tional human rights or liberal economic standards.31 Those 
standards might reflect some of the norms that U.S. citizens 
most prize or that the United States can most fruitfully promote 
abroad, or they could be replaced by standards that do incorpo­
rate such norms. Common statutory provisions that trigger legal 
consequences only upon findings of "consistent patterns" of 
"gross violations" of human rights in target countries, and the 
partially discretionary character of many statutory sanctions sug­
gest a recognition of the importance of prudential concerns.32 
They also suggest room for an approach that addresses them 
3 1 .  See, e.g. , 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304 (d) ( 1 )  ( 1 994) (representing typical provision defin­
ing "gross violation of internationally recognized human rights" - a basis for denying 
security assistance � as including "torture or cruel, inhuman, or  degrading treatment 
or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial,  causing the disappear­
ance of persons" ) ;  19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 ( 1 994) (prohibiting MFN s tatus for "non-market 
economy country" that denies or financially burdens emigration ) ;  22 U.S.C.S.  § 2 295 (a)  
( 1 994) ( condi tioning aid to former Soviet Union counrries on respect for internation­
ally recognized human rights including rights of minorities and freedom of religion 
and emigration, and on progress toward democratic system, representative govern­
ment, rule of law and economy based on market principles, and private ownership ) ; 1 2  
U.S.C.S.  § 635 ( b) ( 2 )  ( 1 994) (prohibiting Export-Import Bank credits to countries with 
Marxist-Leninist planned economies) . 
32.  See, e.g. , 22 U .S.C.S. § 2 1 5 l (a) ( 1 994) ("consistent pattern of gross violations" 
provision in development assistance statute) ; 1 9  U .S.C.S. § 2432 (c) ( 2 )  ( 1 994) (provid­
ing that President has authority to waive MFN prohibition upon determination that 
waiver wil l  promote statute's goals ) ;  22 U.S.C.S.  § 2304(a) ( 2 )  ( 1 994) (providing that 
President has authori ty to waive security assistance ban upon determination that certain 
"extraordinary circumstances" exist) ; 22 U.S.C.S.  § 2295a (c)  (providing that President 
has authority to extend aid to ineligible countries of former Soviet Union upon deter­
mination that providing assistance would be in national interest or would promote stat­
ute's substan tive goals ) .  
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under a more coherent and systematic policy, and less in an ad 
hoc manner. 
These prudential concerns also point to the other side of 
the opportunities presented by the intranational fragmentation 
and transnational linkages that seem to characterize the era now 
upon us. Within the nations of the East and the South, signifi­
cant groups have come to adapt and adopt as their own views 
quite compatible with many items on an imaginable agenda for 
promoting liberal domestic legal orders and a robust role for 
international law.33 Underscoring the dynamism and indetermi­
nacy of approaches to law and politics outside the West, the pres­
ence of such groups undermines simplistic cultural relativist cri­
tiques, and offers fertile soil for transnational linkages to foster 
domestic legal and political changes on a front much broader 
than that promised by international economic interdependence.  
By establishing ties with like-minded counterparts in the West 
and by making appeals to international legal principles, such 
groups may find material, diplomatic,  and intellectual resources 
with which to strengthen their hands at home. Thus, for impor­
tant segments of profoundly diverse societies, prudence and 
principle can coincide both in defining the roles of interna­
tional law and in shaping domestic law in non-Western nations. 
What emerges is a prospective role for international law in 
which it  becomes more closely linked to domestic legal orders 
and global liberal agendas in a species of transnational law for 
the twenty-first century. With the notion of international law's 
proj ect so conceived, advocates of strong roles and liberal con­
tent for such law can keep faith with their own core principles 
(albeit a more eclectic and pragmatic subset of those principles) .  
At the same time, these advocates can keep faith with the future 
sought by their counterparts outside the West who are engaged 
in struggles to promote similar values in their nations' domestic 
legal orders and their states' engagement with the international 
legal order. 
33. See, e.g. , Sidney Jones, The Organic Growth: Asian NGOs Have Come into Their 
Own, F.-\R E. EcoN. REv., June 1 7, 1 993, at 23 (noting importance of Asian non-govern­
mental organizations' efforts in forcing Asian governments to heed demands of poor, 
marginalized, and abused) . 
